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Executive Summary 
 
This supplementary submission considers a number of new developments in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement in Canada, North America, the European Union, and Africa. This 
supplementary submission highlights the application of Investor-State Dispute Settlement in 
the context of water rights, intellectual property, and media regulation. This supplementary 
submission also highlights the conflict between domestic courts and international tribunals in 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, raising significant issues about the rule of law and justice. 
 
Recommendation 14 
In light of the work of Maude Barlow and the Council of Canadians, it is evident 
that Investor-State Dispute Settlement has a significant impact upon water 
rights. 
 
Recommendation 15 
There have been reservations expressed about Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
by both Canada and Germany in discussions over the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA). 
 
Recommendation 16 
There has been great controversy in the European Union during consultations 
over the possible inclusion of Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. 
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Recommendation 17 
In light of the Al-Jazeera dispute, Investor-State Dispute Settlement could have a 
significant impact upon Australian media and communications law – particularly 
in respect of the regulation of media ownership, diversity, and content. 
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14. Water Rights 
 
 
 
Maude Barlow is the chairperson of the Council of Canadians, and the founder of the Blue 
Planet Project. She is a recipient of Sweden’s Right Livelihood Award, and a Lannan 
Cultural Freedom Fellowship. As well as being a noted human rights and trade activist, 
Barlow is the author of a number of books on water rights – including Blue Gold,1 Blue 
Covenant,2 and Blue Future.3 She has been particularly vocal on the impact of trade and 
investment agreements upon water rights. Barlow has been critical of the push to include 
investor-state dispute settlement clauses in trade agreements – such as the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
                                                          
1
  Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke, Blue Gold: The Fight to Stop the Corporate Theft of the World’s 
Water, New York and London: The New Press, 2002.  
2
  Maude Barlow, Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and the Coming Battle for the Right to Water, 
New York: The New Press, 2007.  
3
  Maude Barlow, Blue Future: Protecting Water for People and the Planet Forever, Toronto and New 
York: The New Press, 2013. 
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Agreement (TTIP). She has also been concerned by the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) 
leaked by WikiLeaks. 
 
In her book Blue Future, Maude Barlow reflects upon the recognition by the United Nations 
General Assembly of the human right to safe and clean drink water and sanitation as 
‘essential for the full enjoyment of the right to life’.4 She observed: 
 
Recognizing a right is simply the first step in making it a reality for the millions who are living in the 
shadow of the greatest crisis of our era. With our insatiable demand for water, we are creating the 
perfect storm for an unprecedented world water crisis: a rising population and an unrelenting demand 
for water by industry, agriculture, and the developed world; over-extraction of water from the world’s 
finite water stock; climate change, spreading drought; and income disparity between and within 
countries, with the greatest burden of the race for water falling on the poor.5 
 
Barlow enunciates several principles for a water-secure future. First, she emphasizes that 
water is a human right. Second, Barlow emphasizes that water is a common heritage, and 
must not be allowed to become a commodity to be bought and sold on the open market. 
Third, she makes the case for the protection of source water and watershed governance. 
Finally, she hopes that communities can ‘come together around a common threat – the end of 
clean water – and find a way to live more lightly on this planet’.6 Barlow maintains that ‘the 
grab for the planet’s dwindling resources is the defining issue of our time.’7 She contends: 
‘Water is not a resource put here solely for our convenience, pleasure, and profit; it is the 
source of all life.’8 
 
Barlow is concerned about how water rights will be affected trade and investment agreements 
– such as Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the 
European Union, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP), and the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). 
 
                                                          
4
  Maude Barlow, Blue Future: Protecting Water for People and the Planet Forever, Toronto and New 
York: The New Press, 2013, 1.  
5
  Ibid., 2. 
6
  Ibid., 4. 
7
  Ibid., 4. 
8
  Ibid., 4-5. 
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A. Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
 
In her book, Barlow expresses concerns about how ‘increasingly the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is being used to challenge the rights of 
governments to introduce new environmental or health regulations.’9 She mentions the action 
by Philip Morris against Australia’s plain packaging of tobacco products;10 and the action by 
the Swedish company, Vattenfall, against Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear power.11 
 
In light of such significant controversies, Barlow explores the use of investor-state dispute 
settlement in respect of water resources: 
 
Water companies are using this court to fight governments that try to regain public control of their 
water services. In 1999, Azurix, a subsidiary of Enron Corporation, agreed to purchase the exclusive 
right to provide water and sanitation services to parts of Buenos Aires for thirty years. When the 
Argentine government issued a warning to citizens to boil their water after an algae outbreak, some 
customers refused to pay their water bills; the company withdrew from the contract and sued the 
government. A 2007 ICSID tribunal found in favour of the company and ordered the government of 
Argentina to pay $165 million in compensation.12 In 2010 the ICSID again ruled in favour of a water 
company, in a dispute involving the French transnational Suez.13 This time it was the Argentine 
government that rescinded the contract, because of concerns over water quality, lack of wastewater 
treatment, and mounting tariffs.14 
                                                          
9
  Ibid., 94. 
10
  Philip Morris v. Australia, ‘Tobacco Plain Packaging – Investor-State Arbitration’,  
http://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging 
11
  Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/1654 and Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG 
v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6 (formerly Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, 
Vattenfall Europe Generation AG & Co. KG v. The Federal Republic of Germany)  
http://www.italaw.com/cases/1148 
12
  Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12  
http://www.italaw.com/cases/118  
13
  Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua 
S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 (formerly Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A, 
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua, S.A.) 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/1048  
14
  Maude Barlow, Blue Future: Protecting Water for People and the Planet Forever, Toronto and New 
York: The New Press, 2013, 94-95. 
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In the view of Barlow, investor-state dispute settlement has been used to entrench and protect 
the privatisation of water projects, and the commodification of water. 
 
Barlow has been disturbed by the operation of investor-state dispute settlement clauses under 
the North America-Free Trade Agreement 1994 (NAFTA). She has commented on a number 
of controversies: 
 
Canada’s freshwater heritage, for instance, has been directly affected by Chapter 11, the investor-state 
clause of NAFTA, which allows American corporations operating in Canada to sue for financial 
compensation if any changes are made to the policies or practices under which they first invested. In 
2002, S.D. Myers, an American company specializing in disposal of hazardous waste, including PCBs, 
was awarded more than $8 million from the Canadian government for loss of profit after Canada 
banned trade in PCBS to protect the environment and human health.15 Currently Lone Pine 
Resources,16 an American energy company, is suing the government of Canada for $250,000 because in 
2011 the province of Quebec passed a moratorium on shale-gas fracking in order to protect its water 
reserves.17 
 
Of particular concern to Barlow is the potential use of investor-state dispute settlement in 
respect of Alberta’s Tar Sands: ‘If the government of Alberta were ever to limit the current 
water access of energy companies operating in the tar sands, say legal experts, the American 
companies could sue for huge sums of compensation from the government of Canada’.18 She 
is concerned that such a measure could have a chilling effect upon government regulation: 
‘Equally worrisome, they say, is that the threat of such compensation might prevent the 
Alberta government from taking such a step in the first place, allowing American energy 
corporations to dictate Canadian policy.’19 
 
                                                          
15
  S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL http://www.italaw.com/cases/969  
16
  Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/1606 
17
  Maude Barlow, Blue Future: Protecting Water for People and the Planet Forever, Toronto and New 
York: The New Press, 2013, 215. 
18
  Ibid., 215. 
19
  Ibid., 215. 
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Barlow has also been disturbed by the Government of Canada awarding compensation to a 
United States company, Abitibi Bowater, for water rights after it abandoned its Canadian 
operations.20 Barlow commented: 
 
After running a pulp and paper mill in Newfoundland for more than a century, U.S. forestry giant 
Abitibi Bowater declared bankruptcy and left the province in 2008. The Newfoundland government 
expropriated the company’s assets in the province, including its water rights, in order to help pay for 
environmental cleanup and pensions for laid-off workers. The Newfoundland government argued that 
the water belonged to the province and was allocated to the company only as it operated a mill there. 
Abitibi Bowater sued the Canadian government under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, and the Harper 
government settled without going to a NAFTA tribunal, giving the company $130 million in 
compensation. This has set a dangerous precedent whereby corporations from one country operating in 
another can now claim ownership of local water supplies, thus providing one more way in which the 
world’s water is becoming commodified and privatized.21 
 
In her view, the investment regime in NAFTA undermines water rights and water sovereignty 
in Canada. 
 
There has been a larger concern as to whether Canadian companies will invoke investor-state 
dispute settlement if the Keystone XL Pipeline is blocked or delayed. TransCanada Corp. 
CEO Russ Girling has commented on the issue: 
 
Those are issues that are sort of well beyond what we're contemplating at the current time and not 
something we've spent a whole bunch of time analysing. Down the road that's something that hopefully 
we don't have to take a look at, but obviously something that we would have to look at if we end up in a 
situation where the pipeline's delayed indefinitely or denied. "Our view is this pipeline looks no 
different than other pipelines that have been approved, that continue to be approved in the United 
States. We can't think of a legitimate reason why we can't move forward with this pipeline at the 
current time... Our focus is on getting a pipeline built and doing what's necessary to provide the 
authorities with the information they need to make a positive decision.22 
 
                                                          
20
  AbitibiBowater Inc., v. Government of Canada http://www.italaw.com/cases/39  
21
  Maude Barlow, Blue Future: Protecting Water for People and the Planet Forever, Toronto and New 
York: The New Press, 2013, 215. 
22
  Lauren Krugel, ‘TransCanada says no NAFTA Challenge to Keystone XL Delays – for Now’, The 
Canadian Press, CTV News, 2 May 2014,  http://www.ctvnews.ca/business/transcanada-says-no-nafta-
challenge-to-keystone-xl-delays-for-now-1.1803702#ixzz30uRJfDco 
10 
 
There has also been discussion as to whether the Canadian Government would bring a 
country-to-country action against the United States if the Keystone XL Pipeline was delayed 
or blocked.23 There has been discussion as to whether free trade agreements will fast-track 
the controversial proposal.24 
 
Maude Barlow has also expressed concerns about the use of investor-state dispute settlement 
clauses in disputes over mining – such as in El Salvador.25 
 
B. Trade Agreements 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
  Claudia Cattaneo, ‘Ottawa Mulls Keystone XL Challenge Under NAFTA After U.S. Dodges Decision 
Again’, Financial Post, 30 April 2014. 
24
  Mark Lippman, ‘Will Free trade Fast-Track Keystone XL with Investor-State Dispute Settlements?’, 
Daily Kos, 14 January 2014, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/01/14/1269654/--CRUDE-PT-2-Will-Free-
trade-fast-track-Keystone-XL-with-Investor-State-Dispute-Settlements# 
25
  Maude Barlow and Jennifer Moore, ‘New Salvadoran Government Inherits Unfair Liability Rules’, The 
Huffington Post, 20 March 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/maude-barlow/new-salvadoran-
government_b_5002534.html  
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Maude Barlow has questioned the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement in NAFTA. 
In a letter to The Globe and Mail on the 30 July 2014, she questioned: 
 
If investor-state dispute settlements were designed “to protect developed-world companies from 
capricious actions by governments of countries without developed-world legal standards,” why were 
they necessary in NAFTA? And why is Canada facing over $2.5-billion in challenges from American 
corporations?26 
 
The Council of Canadians has been critical of the secrecy surrounding the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership.27 Trade campaigner, Stuart Trew, has stressed: ‘There can be no honest talk of 
improving NAFTA while all three countries are busy making it worse in a Trans-Pacific 
Partnership that will, for all intents and purposes, replace the North American agreement.’28 
He commented: ‘From every leaked text, it’s clear the TPP will just entrench NAFTA’s 
corporate privileges and an unsustainable trade model that is getting in the way of addressing 
poverty, inequality and climate change.’29 Harris recommended: ‘If North American leaders 
wanted to do something truly important for trade on the continent, they would come out of 
the dark and open up the negotiating process to public input.’30 
 
Maude Barlow has expressed concerns that CETA poses a threat to local democracy.31 She 
observed that ‘the Harper government is ideologically driven by a belief in the privatization, 
deregulation and strengthened corporate power that attend trade deals like CETA and others 
it is negotiating, and does not encourage debate on any of them.’32 Maude Barlow has been 
heartened by the concerns of Germany about the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement 
                                                          
26
 Maude Barlow, ‘Why in NAFTA Then?’, The Globe and Mail, 30 July 2014, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/letters/july-30-babies-by-design-and-other-letters-to-the-
editor/article19838726/#dashboard/follows/  
27
  Council of Canadians, ‘The Council of Canadians urges North American leaders to publish TPP Text, 
Democratize NAFTA-Plus Trade Talks’, Media Release, 19 February 2014, 
http://www.canadians.org/media/council-canadians-urges-north-american-leaders-publish-tpp-text-democratize-
nafta-plus-trade  
28
  Ibid. 
29
  Ibid. 
30
  Ibid. 
31
  Maude Barlow, ‘CETA: A Threat to Local Democracy’, The Huffington Post, 22 October 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/maude-barlow/ceta_b_1021782.html  
32
  Ibid. 
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in CETA and TTIP.33 She commented: ‘We are pleased that the German government has 
listened to critics of the investor-state dispute settlement provisions of the deal that give 
foreign corporations the right to dictate domestic policy.’34 Scott Harris, trade campaigner 
with the Council of Canadians, observed that European policy-makers had informed about 
the history of investor-state dispute settlement actions in Canada: ‘We've told them about all 
the lawsuits Canada has faced under NAFTA for legitimate regulations that protect our health 
and environment.’35 
 
Maude Barlow’s Council of Canadians has engaged in the public consultation on investment 
protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement in the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership Agreement (TTIP).36 The Council of Canadians expressed its opposition ‘to the 
inclusion of expansive investment protections which favour the rights of foreign investors 
over government policy, and to the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
processes in trade and investment agreements.’37 The Council of Canadians observed: ‘These 
measures unnecessarily subject legitimate domestic regulatory and other policy decisions to 
the risk of challenge by foreign investors and to the decisions of unaccountable arbitrators’.  
 
The Council of Canadians commented: ‘Based on two decades of  Canadian experience we 
are of the opinion that such measures constitute an undemocratic constraint on domestic 
policy, and that the focus of this consultation on minor reforms avoids the more  fundamental 
question about the legitimacy of investor rights and investor-state arbitration.’38  The Council 
of Canadians insisted: ‘ISDS and investment provisions which place the rights of investors 
above the sovereign rights of states to govern in the public interest should not be included in 
                                                          
33
  Council of Canadians, ‘Germany Rejects CETA and TTIP; Council of Canadians Applauds Germany’s 
Decision’, Press Release, 26 July 2014, http://canadians.org/media/germany-rejects-ceta-and-ttip-council-
canadians-applauds-germanys-decision  
34
  Ibid. 
35
  Ibid. 
36
  Council of Canadians, ‘Submission to the Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and 
Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement 
(TTIP)’, June 2014, http://www.tradejustice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2014-06-EC-ISDS-consultation-
CofC-submission.pdf  
37
  Ibid. 
38
  Ibid. 
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either the US-EU TTIP or the Canada-EU CETA.’39 The group emphasized: ‘We see no 
reason why governments –and by extension, taxpayers  –should be held responsible in any 
way for bearing the cost of insuring foreign corporations against the risks inherent in 
choosing to invest in a foreign country.’40 
 
Maude Barlow has also expressed concerns about the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) 
released by WikiLeaks, fearing that it could be used to lock in water privatisation.41 
 
C. Fair Trade 
 
Thinking about such investor-state dispute settlement controversies, Maude Barlow expresses 
concerns over corporations, writing the rules for trade: ‘There are almost three thousand 
bilateral deals between governments, most giving corporations these extraordinary rights, and 
many of them are used to gain access to the commons resources of other countries, placing 
the world’s forests, fish, minerals, land, air, and water supplies under direct control of 
transnational corporations.’42 
 
Barlow observed: ‘Australia [under the Rudd and Gillard Governments] banned the 
negotiation of trade deals that include any type of investor-state clauses, and Brazil, which 
now has the tenth largest GDP in the world, is not a party to any bilateral investment treaties 
and has not ratified the ICSID.’43 She insisted that ‘Australia and Brazil must become a 
model for every country in the world.’ 44  Barlow feared that ‘investor-state clauses that give 
corporations the right to sue foreign governments for compensation or to place a chill on 
governments considering new laws and practices to protect their environment, the health and 
safety of their people, or social rights must go.’45  
                                                          
39
  Ibid. 
40
  Ibid. 
41
  Brett Patterson, ‘TISA Threatens to Lock In Water Privatization’, the Council of Canadians, 3 May 
2014, http://www.canadians.org/blog/tisa-threatens-lock-water-privatization  
42
  Maude Barlow, Blue Future: Protecting Water for People and the Planet Forever, Toronto and New 
York: The New Press, 2013, 215. 
43
  Ibid., 230. 
44
  Ibid., 230. 
45
  Ibid., 230. 
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Supporting the work of Thomas McDonagh from the Democracy Center,46 Barlow argued 
that there was a need to completely overhaul investment agreements. She emphasized the 
need for restrictions on the definition of ‘investment’ to ‘prevent investors from interfering in 
a country’s right to set social and environmental standards.’47 She maintained that certain 
principles should be embedded in such agreements – including the primacy of human rights 
before corporate rights; the recognition of the role of domestic courts; binding obligations on 
corporations; policy space for local economic development; and capital controls to stem 
financial speculation. Barlow also supported the efforts of Jerry Mander and John Cavanagh 
to develop an alternative model of trade and development.48 In particular, she emphasized 
that economic development and trade activity and policy should enhance the core labour 
rights and human rights included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two 
covenants ensuring economic, social, and cultural rights as well.’49 
 
In the conclusion, Maude Barlow maintains that there is a need to ensure that trade protects 
water: 
 
Given the threat to water from existing and proposed trade and investment agreements, it is urgent to 
remove all references to water as a service, good, or investment in all present and future treaties. Water 
is not like anything else on earth. There is no substitute for it, and we and the planet cannot survive 
without it. Water must not be a tradable good, service, or investment in any treaty between 
governments and corporations should have no right to stop domestic or international protection of 
water.50 
 
                                                          
46
  Thomas McDonagh, Unfair, Unsustainable, and Under the Radar: How Corporations Use Global 
Investment Rules to Undermine a Sustainable Future, San Francisco: Democracy Center, May 2013, 
http://democracyctr.org/new-report-unfair-unsustainable-and-under-the-radar/  
47
  Maude Barlow, Blue Future: Protecting Water for People and the Planet Forever, Toronto and New 
York: The New Press, 2013, 230. 
48
  John Cavanagh and Jerry Mander (ed.), Alternatives to Economic Globalization, San Francisco: 
Berrett-Koehler, 2002, http://www.amazon.com/Alternatives-Economic-Globalization-Better-
Possible/dp/1576753034  
49
  Maude Barlow, Blue Future: Protecting Water for People and the Planet Forever, Toronto and New 
York: The New Press, 2013, 231. 
50
  Ibid., 233. 
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Barlow maintains that ‘trade negotiations should take into account the effect on water of all 
trade activities’.51 She concludes that ‘removing water as a tradable good, service, or 
investment from all trade and investment treaties would provide a better framework to protect 
water in international trade.’52 
 
Recommendation 14 
In light of the work of Maude Barlow and the Council of Canadians, it is evident 
that Investor-State Dispute Settlement has a significant impact upon water 
rights. 
 
 
  
                                                          
51
  Ibid., 233. 
52
  Ibid., 235. 
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14. CETA – The Canada-Europe Trade Agreement 
 
 
 
There has been much controversy over investor-state dispute settlement in the trade 
negotiations between Canada and the European Union, with significant objections from both 
Canada and Germany. Inside Trade reported that one of the ‘biggest obstacles to concluding 
a deal in time for the May 7 bilateral meeting was Canada’s request to exclude certain 
intellectual property (IP) policies from the scope of an investor-state dispute settlement 
(ISDS) mechanism, which the EU strongly opposes.’53 
 
                                                          
53
  Mike Palmedo, ‘Eli Lilly’s NAFTA Dispute Against Canadian Patent Ruling Affecting Other Trade 
Negotiations’, InfoJustice.Org, 12 May 2014, http://infojustice.org/archives/32724  
17 
 
Moreover, Germany has expressed concerns about the inclusion of an investor-state dispute 
settlement regime. Glyn Moody noted that the newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung reported: 
‘German EU diplomats confirmed in Brussels on Friday that the [German] federal 
government could not sign the agreement with Canada "as it is now negotiated."’54 Moreover, 
Moody reported from the German paper: ‘Although Germany was, in principle, ready to 
initial the agreement in September, the chapter on the legal protection of investors is however 
'problematic' and currently not acceptable.’55 There has been much discussion about whether 
investor protection will unravel the Canada-EU trade deal.56 There has been debate about 
whether Germany will try to limit the scope of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, or block  
the regime altogether.57 
The Government of Canada has been particularly disturbed by the action brought by Eli Lilly 
under an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism over the rejection of drug patents. In 
June 2014, Canada published a statement of its defence in the Eli Lilly dispute.58 In its 
preliminary statement, the Government of Canada observed: 
 
Eli Lilly and Company (“Lilly” or “Claimant”) is a disappointed litigant. Having lost two patent cases 
before the Canadian courts, it now seeks to have this Tribunal misapply NAFTA Chapter Eleven and 
                                                          
54
  Glyn Moody, ‘TTIP Update XXXIV’, Computer World, 30 July 2014, 
http://blogs.computerworlduk.com/open-enterprise/2014/07/ttip-update-xxxiv/index.htm  
55
  Ibid. 
56
  Les Whittington, ‘Investor Protection Fears Could Unravel Canada-EU Trade Deal’, The Toronto Star, 
26 July 2014, 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/07/26/investor_protection_fears_could_unravel_canadaeu_trade_dea
l.html  
57
  Jeevan Vasagar and Christian Oliver, ‘Germany seeks to Limit Investor Protection to Save Trade 
Deal’, Financial Times, 4 August 2014, http://www.bilaterals.org/?germany-seeks-to-limit-investor  
58
 Eli Lilly v. Government of Canada, Statement of Defence, Defence, 30 June 2014, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC4672_
En&caseId=C3544  
18 
 
transform itself into a supranational court of appeal from reasoned, principled, and procedurally just 
domestic court decisions. Claimant argues that the domestic court decisions invalidating its patents are 
measures  that violate NAFTA Chapter Eleven. Claimant does this on the basis of misstatements of  the 
content of Canadian law and of Canada’s international obligations. Its claim is wholly without merit 
and should be dismissed, with full costs to Canada.59 
 
In its Statement of Defence, Canada provides: ‘(1) an overview in Canadian  patent law, to 
provide context for Claimant’s misstatements regarding Canadian law on utility; (2)  a 
description of the specific role played by the Federal Court in applying the Patent Act, 
establishing that the court is responsible for determining the validity and  existence of the 
intellectual property right; (3) an outline of  the facts relevant to the two court proceedings, 
demonstrating that Claimant received full due process and reasoned and principled decisions; 
and (4) brief comments on Canada’s international intellectual property obligations under 
NAFTA Chapter Seventeen, TRIPS and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”), confirming 
that these have no bearing on this case’.60 Canada maintains that ‘nothing in the two court  
decisions at issue in any way violates Canada’s obligations under Chapter Eleven of 
NAFTA.’61 
 
Professor Richard Gold and Michael Shortt have provided a comprehensive analysis of the 
patent issues at stake in the controversy.62 
 
In a recent commentary, Professor Michael Geist from the University of Ottawa considers the 
controversy over the Eli Lilly dispute, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Rules, and the 
Canada-EU Trade Agreement.63 
                                                          
59
  Ibid. 
60
  Ibid. 
61
  Ibid. 
62
  E. Richard Gold and Michael Shortt, ‘The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around the World’, 
(2014) 30 Canadian Intellectual Property Review 35 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361146  
63
 Professor Michael Geist, ‘Crumbling CETA Investor-State Dispute Settlement Rules Threaten to Take 
Down the Canada-EU Trade Agreement’, the University of Ottawa, 28 July 2014, 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2014/07/crumbling-ceta-investor-state-dispute-settlement-rules-threaten-take-
canada-eu-trade-agreement/   
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Crumbling CETA?: The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Rules Threaten to Take 
Down the Canada – EU Trade Agreement  
Professor Michael Geist 
July 28, 2014  
 
On September 12, 2011, the Council of the European Union issued a 20-page press release 
that provided updates on the 3109th Council meeting. On page 13, there was single sentence 
on EU trade policy: 
 
The Council authorised the Commission, on behalf of the EU, to open negotiations on 
investment with Canada, India, and Singapore within the framework of the ongoing bilateral 
negotiations with these countries on trade liberalisation. 
 
The Canada – EU trade negotiations had started several years earlier and the late addition of 
investment did not attract significant attention at the time (the major focus was on the divide 
over intellectual property and procurement issues). Yet months after Canada and the EU 
announced that they had reached agreement on CETA, it is the investment provisions, 
particularly the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) rules, that could seemingly derail the 
entire agreement. 
 
Reports out of Germany now indicate that it is not willing to sign CETA if it includes ISDS 
provisions. While both the Canadian government (which says negotiations continue) and the 
German government (which now says it will “meticulously” examine the agreement) have 
downplayed the report, the ISDS issue has clearly been brewing for months. 
 
Canadian activists had flagged it weeks ago, noting the mounting opposition to ISDS rules in 
Germany arising as a result of 2012 claim by a Swedish company seeking billions in 
compensation for Germany’s decision to phase-out nuclear power. Moreover, the issue has 
taken hold throughout Europe with the growing realization that the CETA provisions are 
likely to be matched in the far larger U.S. – Europe Union agreement called the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The linkage of CETA and TTIP has been 
disastrous for Canadian officials who had hoped to conclude CETA before the U.S. deal 
captured the limelight.  Now that the two agreements are viewed as linked (the above photo is 
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taken from German protests that explicitly combine CETA and TTIP), the Canadian deal may 
be held up by the controversy associated with TTIP alone. 
 
While European opposition mounts, it is important to note that Canada was also delaying 
finalizing CETA due to ISDS concerns. In Canada’s case, the $500 million Eli Lilly lawsuit 
over Canadian patent law awoke the government to the enormous risk associated with ISDS 
provisions. Canada has a strong case in defending against the lawsuit, but the risk that one 
lawsuit could expand to others means that billions may be at stake.  That is why the Canadian 
government has been pushing for inclusion of the following clause in CETA to remove the 
risk of replicating the Eli Lilly lawsuit: 
 
For greater certainty, this Article does not apply to a decision by a court, administrative 
tribunal, or other governmental intellectual property authority, limiting or creating an 
intellectual property right, except where the decision amounts to a denial of justice or an 
abuse of right. 
 
The two sides of have yet to reach agreement on the issue, but given the opposition in 
Europe, the risk to Canada, and the mediocre Canadian track record on ISDS claims in 
NAFTA, it may be in everyone’s interest to go back to the drawing board on CETA by 
eliminating ISDS altogether. 
 
Recommendation 15 
There have been reservations expressed about Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
by both Canada and Germany in discussions over the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA). 
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16. The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
 
 
 
Since the call for submissions, there have been significant developments in respect of 
investor-state dispute settlement in the European Union. 
 
In Germany, there has been a reaction against investor-state dispute settlement clauses in the 
context of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Glyn Moody reported that 
senior members of the German Government were highly critical of such measures: 
 
The German federal government rejects special rights for corporations in the free trade agreement 
between the EU and the USA. ‘The federal government is doing all it can to ensure that it doesn't come 
to this,’ said the Secretary of State in the Federal Ministry of Economics, Brigitte Zypries, on 
Wednesday during question time in parliament. ‘We are currently in the consultation process and are 
committed to ensuring that the arbitration tribunals are not included in the agreement,’ said Ms Zypries. 
 ‘The German federal government's view is that the U.S. offers investors from the EU 
sufficient legal protection in its national courts,’ said the SPD politician Zypries. Equally, U.S. 
investors in Germany have sufficient legal protection through German courts. ‘From the beginning, the 
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federal government has examined critically whether such a provision should be included in the 
negotiations for a free trade agreement,’ Zypries said.64 
 
Glyn Moody commented: ‘Germany's leaders obviously feel the need to distance themselves 
from ISDS, which is fast turning into a serious political liability.’65 
 
Martin Khor has identified a number of reasons for disillusionment with investor-state 
dispute settlement clauses in the European Union: 
 
ISDS cases are also affecting the countries. Germany has been taken to ICSID by a Swedish company 
Vattenfall which claimed it suffered over a billion euros in losses resulting from the government’s 
decision to phase out nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster. And the European public is getting 
upset over the investment system. Two European organisations last year published a report showing 
how the international investment arbitration system is monopolised by a few big law firms, how the 
tribunals are riddled with conflicts of interest and the arbitrary nature of tribunal decisions. That report 
caused shock waves not only in the civil society but also among European policy makers.66 
 
There is both a concern here about government liability in respect of investor-state dispute 
settlement clauses; and an anxiety about the independence and the legitimacy of the 
international tribunal system. 
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  Glyn Moody, ‘Even the German Government Wants Corporate Sovereignty out of TAFTA/ TTIP’, 
TechDirt, 17 March 2014, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140313/10571526568/even-german-government-
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In the European Union, there has been a great deal of controversy over the Vattenfall cases.67 
In the first dispute, the Swedish energy company Vattenfall initiated an investor-state dispute 
settlement procedure against Germany. After constructing a coal fired power plant, Vattenfall 
claimed that the quality standards for waste water of Hamburg’s Environmental Authority 
made the project unviable. The company demanded compensation totalling €1.4 billion. 
Vattenfall and the city of Hamburg eventually settled the case with an agreement. In the 
second dispute, Vattenfall brought an investor-state dispute settlement action against 
Germany in respect of its decision to close down its nuclear power plants, in the wake of the 
Fukushima accident in Japan. According to press sources, the claim for compensation by 
Vattenfall could amount up to €3.7 billion 
 
In 2014, the European Commission has held separate consultations about the inclusion of the 
investor-state dispute settlement regime, given the controversy over the topic: 
 
EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht today announced his decision to consult the public on the 
investment provisions of a future EU-US trade deal, known as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). The decision follows unprecedented public interest in the talks. It also reflects the 
Commissioner's determination to secure the right balance between protecting European investment 
interests and upholding governments’ right to regulate in the public interest. In early March, he will 
publish a proposed EU text for the investment part of the talks which will include sections on 
investment protection and on investor-to-state dispute settlement, or ISDS. This draft text will be 
                                                          
67
  Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/1654 and Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG 
v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6 (formerly Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, 
Vattenfall Europe Generation AG & Co. KG v. The Federal Republic of Germany)  
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accompanied by clear explanations for the non-expert. People across the EU will then have three 
months to comment.  
 EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht said: ‘Governments must always be free to regulate 
so they can protect people and the environment. But they must also find the right balance and treat 
investors fairly, so they can attract investment. International investment agreements like TTIP should 
ensure they do both. But some existing arrangements have caused problems in practice, allowing 
companies to exploit loopholes where the legal text has been vague. I know some people in Europe 
have genuine concerns about this part of the EU-US deal. Now I want them to have their say. I have 
been tasked by the EU Member States to fix the problems that exist in current investment arrangements 
and I'm determined to make the investment protection system more transparent and impartial, and to 
close these legal loopholes once and for all. TTIP will firmly uphold EU member states' right to 
regulate in the public interest.’68 
 
The European Commission still seems to be pushing for an investment clause – but there is 
concerted opposition to the regime from nation-states, political parties, and civil society 
groups. There remains great concern about the drastic increase in government liability under 
investor-state dispute settlement.69 
 
The European Commission received 149,399 submissions in respect of the inclusion of an 
investor-state dispute settlement regime in the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership.70 
 
There has been heavy criticism of investment-state dispute settlement clauses in the European 
consultations. Jan Kleinheisterkamp from the London School of Economics provided a useful 
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critique of the weak justifications for the regime.71 The academic questions the need for 
investor-state dispute settlement:  
 
It is uncontroversial that the implementation of the TTIP obligations relating to investment in the US 
will be politically difficult. But this circumstance cannot, in itself, provide a justification for a rather 
fundamental policy choice, i.e. to accept the creation of a new jurisdiction that would allow US 
investors in the EU to take regulatory disputes out of European courts – with the reverse discrimination 
that this entails for EU investors in the EU. The question to be asked is ultimately whether there is 
something fundamentally wrong with the judicial systems on both sides of the Atlantic. And even if 
that were the case, the real question would be whether any structural deficiencies in the U.S. or EU 
judiciaries should be reformed by the creation of a parallel new jurisdiction, for which there is less than 
a good arguable case. Whereas there might be good justifications for inserting ISDS in future EU 
agreements, those presented by the Commission in relation to the United States so far are not really 
convincing.72 
 
The academic makes the point that there is no broader problem with the judicial systems to 
justify an investor-state dispute settlement regime: ‘Whereas some few cases may have been 
unfortunate, they do not reveal any systemic deficiency capable of proper remediation’.73 
The academic observes: ‘On the contrary, those cases cited by the Commission, if anything, 
rather suggest weaknesses of investor-state arbitration as well as a lack of efficiency of ISDS 
mechanisms to overcome the foreign investors’ problem.’74 
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Investment Partnership (TTIP)?’ (February 14, 2014), SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2410188  
72
  Ibid. 
73
  Ibid. 
74
  Ibid. 
26 
 
It is particularly worth highlighting the submission of over 100 leading academics on 
investor-state dispute settlement.75 This statement of concern was written by Harm Schepel 
(Kent Law School) Peter Muchlinski (SOAS School of Law), Horatia Muir Watt (Sciences 
Po Law School), and Gus Van Harten (Osgoode Hall Law School). The submission 
expressed ‘deep concern about the planned Treaty in general and voicing strong criticism of 
the proposed provisions in particular’.  The authors were joined by ‘nine members of 
academic staff from Kent Law School and over a hundred other prominent scholars from all 
over Europe and across the globe with expertise in trade and investment law, public 
international law and human rights, European Union law, global political economy, 
comparative law, public law and private law’. The writers noted that ‘Investment arbitration 
law, after all, is far too important to leave to just investment lawyers.’76  
 
It is worth reproducing the key summary in this submission: 
 
What is your overall assessment of the proposed approach on substantive standards of protection and 
ISDS as a basis for investment negotiations between the EU and US? Do you see other ways for the EU to 
improve the investment system? Are there any other issues related to the topics covered by the 
questionnaire that you would like to address? 
 
The Commission’s consultation document is an extraordinary text. On the one hand, the document contains 
fierce (and, in our opinion, fully justified) criticism of the international investment treaty arbitration regime as it 
has developed over the last two decades or so in a rapidly expanding number of awards under some 2800 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, NAFTA, and the Energy Charter. Both explicitly and implicitly, the document 
disapproves of widespread expansive interpretations of nearly every provision found in investment treaties: from 
Most Favored Nation to umbrella clauses, from National Treatment to Fair and Equitable Treatment, from 
indirect expropriation to threshold issues of corporate nationality. The document also implicitly condemns the 
investment arbitration community for its failure to police itself adequately in matters of ethics, independence, 
competence, impartiality, and conflicts of interest. By implication, the document acknowledges that the 
institutional design of investment arbitration has given rise to reasonable perceptions that the decision-making 
process is biased against some states and investors as well as various interests of the general public. 
 
And yet, on the other hand, the Commission seems content to entrust to these same actors the vital constitutional 
task of weighing and balancing the right to regulate of sovereign states and the property rights of foreign 
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investors. This task is one of the most profound roles that can be assigned to any national or international 
judicial body. The proposed text requires arbitrators to determine whether discriminatory measures are 
‘necessary’ in light of the relative importance of the values and interests the measures seek to further; whether 
the impact of non-discriminatory ‘indirect expropriations’ have a ‘manifestly excessive impact’ on investors in 
light of the regulatory purpose of these measures; whether other non discriminatory measures amount to 
arbitrariness or fall short of standards of due process and transparency, and whether prudential regulations are 
‘more burdensome than necessary to achieve their aim’. To entrust these decisions to the very actors who have 
an apparent financial interest in the current situation and moreover remain unaccountable to society at large is a 
contentious situation. In light of the criticism inherent in the consultation document, not to mention the 
fundamental concerns of many observers of the system, there seems to be consensus that the regime falls short 
of the standards required of an institutionally independent and accountable dispute settlement system. 
 
In our view, the logical implication of the Commission’s stance is to raise the key question that is not asked in 
the consultation document: why consider including investor-state arbitration in the TTIP at all? The rationale for 
bilateral investment treaties was traditionally linked to views about the potential impact on foreign investment of 
uncertainty caused by weak legal and judicial systems in host countries. While such a vision of failed statehood 
should in itself be examined further, it suffices to point out, in the context of the relationship between the US 
and the EU, that it is difficult to argue realistically that investors have cause to worry about domestic legal 
systems on either side of the Atlantic. Above all, with FDI stocks of over €1,5 trillion either way, it is 
implausible to claim that investors in fact have been deterred. It is true, as the Commission points out, that nine 
Member States already have BITs in place with the US. It may also be true that, for these nine Member States, 
the new arrangement might be a better alternative than ‘doing nothing.’ That, however, hardly seems enough 
reason to impose on the other two thirds of Member States a Treaty that profoundly challenges their judicial, 
legal and regulatory systems. The consultation document comes up with one additional argument: that the rights 
each party grants to its own citizens and companies ‘are not always guaranteed to foreigners and foreign 
investors.’ The claim is unsubstantiated. Even if it is accepted, there is no obvious reason why the incorporation 
in TTIP of a simple norm of non discriminatory legal protection and equal access to domestic courts could not 
address the problem perfectly adequately. 
 
Commissioner De Gucht has announced an ambitious programme to‘re-do’ investment law, make the system 
‘more transparent and impartial’, ‘build a legally water-tight system’, and ‘close these legal loopholes once and 
for all.’ As we have shown in detail, the consultation document and reference text fail to achieve this. 
Specifically, the text: 
• Fails to exclude acquisitions of sovereign debt instruments from the scope of the Treaty 
• Allows anyone with a substantial business activity in the home state who holds any ‘interest’ in an 
enterprise in the host state to bring a claim 
• Fails to spell out legal duties of investors in host states 
• Fails to control the expansion of investment arbitration to purely contractual claims 
• Fails to protect the ‘right to regulate’ as a general right of states alongside the many elaborate rights 
and protections of foreign investors, let alone as a component of the FET and Expropriation standards 
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• Allows for unwarranted discretion for arbitration tribunals in various ‘necessity’ tests 
• Fails to further the stated principle of favoring domestic court proceedings 
• Fails to regulate conflicts of interest in the adjudicative process 
• Fails to formulate a policy on appellate mechanisms with any precision 
• Fails to formulate a policy on avoiding ‘Treaty shopping’ with any precision 
• and Fails to formulate a policy on third party submissions with any precision. 
 
The text, in fairness, is rather better than many Investment Treaties. Some of its flaws, as we have discussed, 
could be addressed. But the nature of the problems associated with investor-state arbitration is not quite as 
straightforward as the Commission presents it. In a strange cat-and-mouse game, the Commission’s objective 
seems to be to ‘outwit’ arbitrators by closing down ‘loopholes’, eradicating discretion, and putting in place firm 
‘rules’ on transparency of proceedings and impartiality of arbitrators. Analysis of the consultation document and 
the reference text, however, does not allow for the conclusion that this objective is likely to be achieved. 
 
Yet investor-state arbitration raises some profoundly troublesome political issues regardless of arbitrator 
discretion. Investor-state arbitration delivers undue structural advantages to foreign investors and risks distorting 
the marketplace at the expense of domestically-owned companies. The benefits to foreign investors include their 
exclusive right of access to a special adjudicative forum, their ability to present facts and arguments in the 
absence of other parties whose rights and interests are affected, their exceptional role in determining the make-
up of tribunals, their ability to enforce awards against states as sovereigns, the role of appointing bodies 
accountable directly to investors or major capital-exporting states, the absence of institutional safeguards of 
judicial independence that otherwise insulate adjudicators in asymmetrical adjudication from financial 
dependence on prospective claimants, and the bargaining advantages that can follow from these other benefits in 
foreign investors’ relations with legislatures, governments, and courts. At root, the system involves a shift in 
sovereign priorities toward the interests of foreign owners of major assets and away from those of other actors 
whose direct representation and participation is limited to democratic processes and judicial institutions. 
 
In our view, this public consultation offers a good opportunity for the European Union to reflect seriously on its 
competences in matters of FDI under the Common Commercial Policy. As the Consultation Notice mentions, 
EU Member States have some 1400 BITs in place. The vast majority of them are concluded with developing 
countries. There is little evidence linking the conclusion of the Treaties to increased flows of FDI, and there is 
little evidence that they contribute to other development goals, such as encouraging good governance. In our 
view, these Investment Treaties and their arbitration mechanisms are in clear tension with the values of Articles 
2 and 3 of the TEU that the Union is to promote in its relations with the wider world. Instead of seeking to 
extend the system of investment arbitration to relations with the United States, the Commission should be 
working towards redefining its policy on Investment Treaties, both new and existing, in ways that make it 
compatible with the founding values of the European Union. This requires a clearer balancing between investor 
rights and responsibilities and the preservation of national policy space to ensure that the interests of other 
stakeholders such as workers, consumers and the wider community as a whole are upheld by government. 
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Q1: Scope of the substantive investment protection provisions  
What is your opinion of the objectives and approach taken in relation to the scope of the substantive 
investment protection provisions in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)? 
 
1. Sovereign debt instruments: In light of the reasoning of (majorities of) the Tribunals in the recent 
Abaclat and Ambiente cases 1, it is clear that the definition of ‘investment’ proposed by the 
Commission will not suffice to exclude acquisitions of sovereign debt instruments, including those on 
secondary markets. It could, perhaps, be argued that the provisions of prudential carve-outs and 
safeguard measures discussed under Question 5 stand against claims brought by (speculative) investors 
in, for example, Greek government bonds complaining about ‘haircuts’ and the general handling of the 
sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. But the prudential carve-out only allows measures to ensure the 
integrity and stability of a party’s financial system in so far as these measures are ‘not more 
burdensome than necessary to achieve their aim’, and the safeguard clause only allows ‘strictly 
necessary’ measures in exceptional circumstances of serious difficulties for the operation of the 
economic and monetary union. It will, hence, fall on arbitration Tribunals to decide whether the 
measures involved were ‘necessary’, a task that should not properly be assigned to such bodies. In light 
of the social misery and hardship the sovereign debt crisis has brought, it requires little discussion to 
conclude that the mere thought of speculative investors in government bonds seeking damages before 
investment arbitration Tribunals is utterly unacceptable. The only appropriate way of excluding this 
possibility is clearly and unequivocally to exclude acquisitions of sovereign debt from the definition of 
‘investment.’ 
 
1Abaclat and Others v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/07/05, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 4 August 2011, and Ambiente Ufficio v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/08/09, Decision 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 8 February 2013. 
2. ‘Substantial business activities’: The requirement to have ‘substantial business activities’ in the home 
country may become a useful check against ‘forum shopping’. Yet it also highlights that the problem of 
forum-shopping originates in the refusal of the majority of arbitrators to pierce the corporate veil, or 
otherwise put reasonable limits on manipulation of corporate chains of nationality by claimants.2 That 
this reference is even necessary should prompt the parties to reconsider their confidence in the system. 
If the Commission really wants to avoid abuse, moreover, it is surely not enough to focus on the extent 
of claimant activities in the home country. The reference text defines ‘a covered investment’ as an 
investment ‘owned or controlled’ by an investor of the other Party. But ‘investment’ itself is defined 
broadly and includes, for example, any equity stake, corporate bonds, loans and indeed ‘any other kinds 
of interest in an enterprise.’ Given the realities of modern financial markets, including equity and bond 
markets, it is difficult to imagine any company of any size and importance on either side of the Atlantic 
in which there is no financial ‘interest’ at all on the other side. It cannot be desirable to allow any US 
holder of a corporate bond issued by a European company to launch an investor-state claim against the 
home state of that European company. 
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3. ‘In accordance with applicable law’: The Commission is worryingly confident about the reference to 
investments ‘made in accordance with applicable law.’ This, it is said, ‘has worked well’ and has a 
‘proven track record’ in enforcing duties of investors. Yet the Commission offers no references to 
support the claim and the strategy is unlikely to deliver what the Commission seems to expect. It 
should at the very least be amended to make clear that investors are expected to respect the law of the 
host country for the duration of the investment2. In any event,the claim of a ‘proven track record’ does 
not explain why the provision is not more explicit about what is expected of investors before they can 
launch a claim. References to an absolute prohibition of any form of bribery and an absolute obligation 
to respect human rights as they are reflected in the law of the host country and in international law 
would seem to be the bare minimum. Where the applicable law does not – for reasons inherent to the 
race for foreign capital on the part of host states – provide adequate protection, the applicable law 
clause should not shield the private investor from liability for human rights violations. 
 
According to the Commission, the reference ‘has allowed ISDS tribunals to refuse to grant investment 
protection to investors who have not respected the law of the host state when making the investment.’ 
It seems obvious that the clause should not ‘allow’ but oblige tribunals to refuse investment protection 
in such circumstances. 
 
2
 See for example Tokios Tokelés v Ukraine, ICSID Case No ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 
April 2004, and Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia, ICSID Case No ARB/02/03, Decision on Respondent’s 
Objection to Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005. For a case where the corporate veil was lifted, see TSA 
Spectrum v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award of 19 December 2008. 
 
Q2: Non-discriminatory treatment for investors 
What is your opinion of the EU approach to non –discrimination in relation to the TTIP? Please explain. 
1. MFN and Investor-State Arbitration: The reference text usefully excludes access to investor-state 
arbitration from MFN, contrary to numerous contentious holdings in investment arbitration starting 
with Maffezini.3 That this reference is necessary should also give the parties reason to reconsider their 
confidence in the system. The reference also does not extend to the arbitrators’ practice, which the 
Commission claims to want to avoid, of importing new substantive standards (beyond dispute 
settlement provisions) from other treaties. To be safe, the treaty should make very clear that MFN 
applies only to domestic regulatory treatment of foreign investors and not to any other treaty. 
 
3
 Maffezini v Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 25 January 
2000. 
 
2. Article XX GATT: The incorporation of Article XX GATT, according to the Commission, ‘allows the 
Parties to take measures relating to the protection of health, the environment, consumers, etc.’ To that 
end, the CETA reference text usefully emphasizes that Parties share an understanding of Article XX (b) 
GATT as including environmental measures and of Article XX (g) GATT as including measures aimed 
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at the protection of living exhaustible natural resources. However, this importation of Article XX 
GATT also includes the proportionality test under the provision’s chapeau. Investment arbitrators will 
hence decide what is ‘necessary’ for the protection of health, the environment, consumers etc., an 
assessment which involves a process of ‘weighing and balancing’ which begins with an assessment of 
the relative importance of the interests or values that the challenged measures intend to pursue, and 
further includes an inquiry into the contribution the contested measure makes towards the stated 
objectives, and a determination as to whether the measure’s restrictive effect is proportionate to its 
effect towards the protection of those interests and values.4 This interpretation is contentious enough in 
inter-state litigation before the WTO Appellate Body, a serious judicial institution: it involves, after all, 
a judicial determination of the ‘relative importance’ of such values or interests as the environment, 
consumer safety, or public health. It is clear that the test is bound to lead to serious trouble when 
administered by investment arbitration tribunals tasked with striking ‘a balance’ between an individual 
company’s economic interests and the democratic collective choice of a body politic. In any event, the 
incorporation of Article XX GATT will not safeguard adequately a ‘right to regulate’. Indeed, a public 
policy exception clause modeled on Article XX GATT creates a perception that regulatory action 
which restricts investor rights is prima facie inconsistent with these rights unless the respondent State 
can discharge the burden of proving that its measures come within the exception. To safeguard a right 
to regulate of states would require a clear and unequivocal statement of the right in the treaty alongside 
the many elaborate rights and protections of foreign investors, which would place the burden of 
proving an infringement upon the claimant investor. 
3.  
4
 This is the test as summarized by the WTO Panel in Brazil-Tyres, WT/DS332/R, Report of 12 June 
2006, para 7.104, imported wholesale by the Tribunal in Continental Casualty v Argentina, ICSID 
Case No ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 2008. 
 
Q3: Fair and equitable treatment 
What is your opinion of the approach to fair and equitable treatment of investors and their investments 
in relation to the TTIP? 
1. FET: The traditional understanding of the FET standard was systematic: under normal circumstances, 
foreign investors are not entitled to different, let alone better, treatment than domestic investors. The 
FET standard was seen as a back-up standard, operating only in the exceptional circumstances where 
the political and legal systems of the host country disintegrate to such an extent that the non-
discrimination norm fails to protect investors from outrageous governmental behavior that is 
shockingly insufficient as measured by international standards. In the hands of investment arbitrators, 
the standard has been radically transformed into an autonomous source of wide-ranging obligations for 
governments. As summed up by one tribunal, the standard is now understood to demand ‘consistent 
and transparent behavior, free of ambiguity that involves the obligation to grant and maintain a stable 
and predictable legal framework necessary to fulfill the justified expectations of the foreign investor.’ 5 
 
The Commission rightly seeks to curtail this unwarranted interpretation. The idea is to propose a closed 
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list of basic obligations, and to insert a separate clause that purports to limit the doctrine of ‘legitimate 
expectations’ to instances where those expectations are generated by specific representations, which 
need not be in writing, made by the host state in order to induce the investment upon which the investor 
relied when making the investment. History suggests that the Commission’s approach is unlikely to 
have the desired effect. States have tried before to curtail the expansive interpretation of FET by 
explicitly stipulating that it does not require treatment that goes beyond the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens and does not create additional substantive rights. 6 These 
efforts, however, have turned fruitless in the face of Tribunals’ insistence that, for example, ‘in fact, the 
Treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment and its connection with the required stability and 
predictability of the business environment, founded on solemn and contractual commitments, is not 
different from the international law minimum standard and its evolution under customary law.’7 If this 
line of reasoning is continued,8 Tribunals will likely consider the doctrine of ‘legitimate expectations’ 
to flow from – and give meaning to – components of the various ‘basic obligations’ that the 
Commission proposes, such as ‘due process’ and the prohibition of ‘arbitrariness.’ In that case, the 
Commission’s efforts to remove the risk of expansive interpretations of the FET standard and the 
concept of an investor’s ‘legitimate expectations’ will have very little effect. 
 
5
 LG&E Energy v Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, para 
131. 
6
 See for example Article 5 (2) of the 2012 US Model BIT. 
7
 CMS Gas v Argentina, ICSID Case ARB/01/8, Award, 12 May 2005, para 284. The Tribunal’s 
reasoning under the FET standard was one of the few passages of the Award that survived the 
Annulment Committee’s scrutiny. See the Decision of the Ad hoc Committee on the Application for 
Annulment of Argentina, 25 September 2007, para 85. 
8
 In fairness, some recent Tribunals have accepted that the FET standard applies only to the most 
egregious cases of maladministration and that it is to be defined in accordance with the international 
minimum standard and its emphasis on the exceptional nature of governmental misconduct. See for 
example Glamis Gold Ltd v United States, UNCITRAL, Award 8 June 2009, and generally UNCTAD 
Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Sequel (New York and Geneva, United Nations, 2012). 
2. Contract claims: More problematic still, the Commission apparently suggests that the widespread 
tendency in investment law to elevate any breach of contract to a breach of treaty obligations is,9 by 
and large, a good idea. By assuming authority over contractual disputes that are subject to their own 
contractually-agreed forum for dispute settlement, numerous investment treaty tribunals have 
disregarded principles of party autonomy, sanctity of contract, and avoidance of duplicate litigation 
which are the hallmarks of arbitration or adjudication generally. The Commission’s text does nothing 
to address this challenge to markets based on legal equality of all investors and contracting parties, 
domestic or foreign. The proposal seeks to exclude only ‘ordinary contractual breaches, like the non-
payment of an invoice.’ From the systematic point of view described above, there is no justified reason 
at all to consider contractual claims under the investment treaty unless the breach amounts to a breach 
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of one the ‘basic obligations’; that is, denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, targeted discrimination 
and so on. 
 
9
 The locus classicus is SGS v Philippines, ICSID Case No ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004. 
 
Q4: Expropriation 
What is your opinion of the approach to dealing with expropriation in relation to the TTIP? Please 
explain. 
The consultation document rightly notes that ‘indirect expropriation has been a source of concern in certain 
cases where regulatory measures taken for legitimate purposes have been subject to investor claims for 
compensation, on the grounds that such measures were equivalent to expropriation because of their significant 
negative impact on investment.’ The document then goes on say that ‘the objective of the EU is to avoid claims 
against legitimate public policy measures.’ The CETA reference text, however, does no such thing. The 
formulation of the relevant clause is as follows: 
 
For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance where the impact of the measure or series of measures is so 
severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory measures by a Party that 
are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the 
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations. 
 
All this achieves is to invite arbitration tribunals to engage in yet more discretionary proportionality analysis 
with, arguably, a somewhat stricter standard of review: ‘manifestly excessive’ rather than ‘not necessary.’ 
 
Tribunals will have a license to substitute their opinion for that of a democratic government on the relative 
importance of the purpose the measures at issue seek to achieve, and to engage in cost-benefit analysis to see 
whether the costs imposed on investors are ‘excessive.’ In the process, they will also feel empowered to analyze, 
as part of the determination of whether the impact of a measure is ‘excessive’ in light of its purpose, whether the 
measure at issue ‘substantially advances’ that stated purpose.10 
 
It may be grounded in several awards of investment tribunals,11 but to bring proportionality analysis into the 
definition of what constitutes an ‘indirect expropriation’ is, quite simply, conceptually flawed. The norm 
governing direct expropriations demands compensation for takings that are (a) for a public purpose, (b) non-
discriminatory, and (c) taken under due process of law. The logical implication is that governments are required 
to pay compensation for every measure that constitutes an ‘expropriation,’ however laudable and beneficial to a 
society as a whole the measure may be.12 This decoupling of the definition of ‘expropriation’ and the purpose 
and effect of the measure at issue logically works both ways however: the fact that a non-discriminatory 
measure designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives may be thoroughly misguided, may 
be badly designed, may have unfair distributive consequences, or is not rationally suited to achieve those 
objectives has no bearing whatsoever on the question of whether it constitutes an ‘expropriation’ or has an effect 
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equivalent to expropriation. Under international law, non-discriminatory measures taken in the exercise of a 
State’s regulatory powers aimed at the general welfare, and which involve the exercise of States’ ‘police 
powers’, are simply not ‘expropriations’ requiring compensation.13 
 
10
 The reference is to the test that a unanimous US Supreme Court banned from takings jurisprudence in Lingle 
v Chevron, 544 US 528 (2005), for its failure to ‘help to identify those regulations whose effects are functionally 
comparable to government appropriation or invasion of private property’ and for empowering and requiring 
courts to ‘substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and expert agencies.’ 
11
 See eg Tecmed v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)00/2, Award, 29 May 2003, para 122. 
12Santa Elena v Costa Rica, ICSID Case No ARB/96/1, Final Award, 17 February 2000, para 72. 
13
 See eg Saluka v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 May 2006, para 255. 
 
Q5: Ensuring the right to regulate and investment protection 
What is your opinion with regard to the way the right to regulate is dealt with in the EU's approach to 
TTIP? 
The issues dealt with under this section have little to do with a ‘right to regulate’ and serve mainly to legitimize 
the carve-outs for the audiovisual sector and prudential regulations. We have dealt with the carve-out and the 
safeguard clause under Question 2. Allowing investment arbitration Tribunals the discretion to determine 
whether measures taken for prudential reasons are not ‘more burdensome than necessary to achieve their aim’ or 
whether safeguard measures are ‘strictly necessary’ does not amount to a ‘right to regulate.’ By its omissions, 
the consultation text actually confirms boldly that the right to regulate has not been affirmed and preserved, by a 
clear and unequivocal statement of the right, alongside the rights and protections of foreign investors. 
 
Q6: Transparency in ISDS 
Please provide your views on whether this approach contributes to the objective of the EU to increase 
transparency and openness in the ISDS system for TTIP. Please indicate any additional suggestions you 
may have.  
Where they apply, the UNCITRAL Rules are reasonable, and their incorporation by reference seems a good 
idea. The Treaty could usefully clarify the nature of a Tribunal’s obligations under Article 3 (4) of the 
UNCITRAL Rules: that provision instructs Tribunals to take into account a) whether the amicus has a 
‘significant interest’ in the proceedings and b) whether the amicus would be able to assist the Tribunal by 
bringing a particular and different perspective when ‘deciding to allow’ third-party submission.’ What form this 
‘decision’ should take, and the extent to which it should be motivated, is left open. At the very least, the 
proposed Treaty should demand of Tribunals to provide a written account of its reasoning under this provision. 
 
Finally, the Commission should ensure that any settlement of a threatened claim, including before the filing of a 
formal notice of consultations, will be made public. 
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Q7: Multiple claims and relationship to domestic courts 
Please provide your views on the effectiveness of this approach for balancing access to ISDS with possible 
recourse to domestic courts and for avoiding conflicts between domestic remedies and ISDS in relation to 
the TTIP. Please indicate any further steps that can be taken. Please provide comments on the usefulness 
of mediation as a means to settle disputes.  
 
1. Domestic proceedings: ‘As a matter of principle’, the document states, ‘the EU approach favors 
domestic courts.’ There is nothing in the text, however, that suggests any action to further that 
principle. The referenced CETA text contains only a limited ‘fork in the road’ provision, not materially 
different from the one found in NAFTA or the US Model BIT. The provision does not oblige or even 
provide an incentive for investors to seek redress in domestic courts, but merely sets out to oblige 
investors to choose between domestic courts and international arbitration. As is the case with most such 
provisions, this one too is bound to prove of limited effect even for its limited purpose; for example, it 
excludes claims or proceedings initiated in domestic courts for monetary damages only, and not claims 
or proceedings seeking injunctions or declarations of unlawfulness, and it will not exclude (counter-) 
claims brought by investors in domestic proceedings for the purpose of preserving their rights and 
interests. The ‘fork in the road’ provision also, rightly, demands claimants to waive their rights to 
‘initiate any claim or proceeding seeking compensation or damages before a tribunal or court under 
domestic or international law with respect to any measure alleged to constitute a breach referred to in 
its claim to arbitration.’ This, too, fails to exclude domestic proceedings or claims seeking redress other 
than monetary damages. Indeed, it allows foreign investors to pursue monetary remedies (not the 
primary remedy in domestic public law) under the treaty and non-monetary orders (not the primary 
remedy in investment treaty arbitration) in domestic courts. The waiver, moreover, ceases to apply the 
moment the arbitration tribunal rejects the investor’s claim on any procedural or jurisdictional grounds, 
even when the claim is found to be frivolous and ‘manifestly without legal merit.’ This, it is submitted, 
severely undermines the intention as per Question 9 of preventing abuse of the arbitration system. 
 
But what of the ‘matter of principle’ of favoring domestic courts? The Commission explains the 
drawbacks of seeking redress in domestic courts as follows: 
 
‘It is often the case that protection offered in investment agreements cannot be invoked before domestic 
courts and the applicable legal rules are different. For example, discrimination in favour of local 
companies is not prohibited under US law but is prohibited in investment agreements. There are also 
concerns that, in some cases domestic courts may favour the local government over the foreign investor 
e.g. when assessing a claim for compensation for expropriation or may deny due process rights such as 
the effective possibility to appeal. Governments may have immunity from being sued. In addition, the 
remedies are often different. In some cases government measures can be reversed by domestic courts, 
for example if they are illegal or unconstitutional. ISDS tribunals cannot order governments to reverse 
measures.’ 
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If this is the extent of the problem, then the solution is fairly straightforward. The Commission should 
insist on the time-honored principle of exhaustion of local remedies, with the qualification that 
investors may be given the opportunity to make the case that domestic proceedings do not offer justice 
or are not reasonably-available according to a set list of criteria having to do with remedies, 
immunities, procedural rules, and other objective grounds. If there are grounds to believe that, in the 
course of domestic judicial proceedings, local companies or local governments have been ‘favored’ or 
‘due process rights such as the right to appeal’ have been denied, the investors may be given the right 
to argue before investment arbitration tribunals that the treatment they have been given by the domestic 
judicial system falls short of the standards of treatment under the Treaty; for example, that it constitutes 
discrimination or ‘denial of justice.’ 
 
2. Treaty shopping: The CETA reference text also contains a provision seeking to prevent the pernicious 
phenomenon of ‘Treaty shopping’. The language is extraordinarily weak, instructing the Tribunal to 
‘stay its proceedings or otherwise ensure that proceedings pursuant to another international agreement 
are taken into account in its decision, order or award.’ If the Commission is serious about avoiding 
investors being grossly over-compensated and about ensuring consistency, it should seek to clarify 
what is expected of Tribunals to ‘otherwise ensure’ that parallel proceedings are ‘taken into account.’  
 
Q8: Arbitrator ethics, conduct and qualifications 
Please provide your views on these procedures and in particular on the Code of Conduct and the 
requirements for the qualifications for arbitrators in relation to the TTIP agreement. Do they improve 
the existing system and can further improvements be envisaged? 
 
1. Rosters: The Commission proposes to set up a roster from which Chairpersons of tribunals are to be 
appointed. As it explains: 
 
The purpose of such a roster is to ensure that the EU and the US have agreed to and vetted the 
arbitrators to ensure their abilities and independence. In this way the responding state chooses one 
arbitrator and has vetted the third arbitrator. 
 
These benefits, obviously, would only arise systematically if the Treaty would break the tradition of 
allowing parties (or, formally, the other two arbitrators) to agree on a Chairperson themselves. From 
the CETA text, moreover, it seems that the intention would be to entrust the task of appointing 
Chairpersons from the roster to the Secretary-General of ICSID a choice that is not explained and for 
which there appears little justification given the lack of any formal accountability of this officer under 
the constitutional orders of the US or EU. 
 
The Commission also states that ‘among those best qualified and who have undertaken such tasks will 
be retired judges.’ The investment arbitration community is composed overwhelmingly of international 
commercial arbitrators, with the addition of a few international law professors and a handful of former 
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(and, imprudently, current) ICJ judges: ‘retired judges’ are few and far between, unless one counts as 
‘retired judges’ people who have served in such institutions as the International Chamber of 
Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the World Bank’s 
Administrative Tribunal, the Dubai International Financial Court, or Ad hoc divisions of CAS for the 
Olympic Games. 
 
2. Conflicts of interest: The Commission, rightly, has misgivings about the standards of ethical behavior 
and conflicts of interest that prevail in the investment arbitration regime. The reference text from 
CETA does not assuage the fears. While it envisages an unresolved or undisclosed code of conduct to 
be adopted by Parties, it relies for the time being on the International Bar Association Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration. This instrument, despite being elaborated under the 
aegis of the IBA, is an act of self-regulation by and for the international arbitration community. The 
text puts the power to decide on challenges of arbitrators in the hands of the ICSID Secretary-General 
instead of a judicial official. In light of what was said above this is inappropriate. 14 
 
The Commission’s stated intention is to introduce a code of conduct in the text of the new Treaty. It is 
so vague on the contents of this code that is difficult to come to any judgment. For example, even if the 
document mentions concerns arising from the fact that arbitrators often appear in various roles in 
different proceedings, the document falls short of proposing what is clearly the one single most 
important rule that is necessary: that arbitrators appointed in cases under the present Treaty may not 
themselves simultaneously be involved in any capacity other than as an adjudicator in any other 
investment arbitration, nor have any professional association – whether in the context of a law firm, 
Barrister’s chambers, or any other similar relationship – with anyone who is involved as counsel or 
party-appointed expert in any investment arbitration. A few arbitrators self-impose this rule. Other 
arbitration systems, such as, for example the Court of Arbitration for Sport, have versions of this rule.15 
Its absence in a process to review decisions by legislatures, governments, and courts in matters of 
profound importance to large numbers of people, at potentially vast cost to the public purse, is totally 
unacceptable. 
 
One consideration underlying this rule has its basis in the economic interests involved with the 
(generously compensated) arbitrator appointments themselves. Here, the suspicion is that arbitrators, 
when they act as counsel, will appoint another arbitrator who may in turn in a subsequent case, when 
acting as counsel, appoint the first. This is certainly a concern, but the more important consideration 
sees to the economic interests involved with the representation of claimants: law-firms involved in this 
work have a clear interest in making sure that claims under investment treaties have a good chance of 
success, and, given the practice of working on contingency fees, a clear interest in higher rather than 
lower awards. It is imperative, from this point of view, to make sure that no one who stands to profit in 
any way from the income generated by the representation of parties to investment disputes acts as an 
arbitrator. 
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More broadly, in a system where only one side, foreign investors, can bring claims, does not everyone 
– such as a retired judge – who works in the system and wants to continue doing so have an apparent 
economic interest to encourage more claims? Even with the most robust code of conduct, the absence 
of basic institutional safeguards of judicial independence undermines fundamentally the claims of 
investor-state arbitration to neutrality and impartiality. 
 
14Mandatory reading in this regard is Professor Dalhuisen’s postscript in Vivendi v Argentina, ICSID 
Case No ARB/97/3, Decision on Argentina’s Request for Annulment of the Award rendered on 20 
August 2007, 10 August 2010. 
15
 Article S18 (3) of the CAS-TAS Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related 
Disputes states that ‘CAS Arbitrators and mediators may not act as counsel for a party before the 
CAS.’ This obviously leaves the gaping loophole of partners and associates of the arbitrator’s law firm 
acting as counsel. 
 
Q9: Reducing the risk of frivolous and unfounded cases 
Please provide your views on these mechanisms for the avoidance of frivolous or unfounded claims and 
the removal of incentives in relation to the TTIP agreement. Please also indicate any other means to limit 
frivolous or unfounded claims.  
The Commission proposes a kind of summary judgment system to provide ‘an early and effective filtering 
mechanism for frivolous claims.’ It seems unlikely that this approach will have any effect. Especially in light of 
the fact that the reference text instructs tribunals to consider the alleged facts to be true, arbitrators will have a 
hard time dismissing claims as ‘manifestly without legal merit’ under the necessarily vague and open-ended 
provisions of an investment treaty. 
 
Q11: Guidance by the Parties (the EU and the US) on the interpretation of the agreement. 
Please provide your views on this approach to ensure uniformity and predictability in the interpretation 
of the agreement to correct the balance? Are these elements desirable, and if so, do you consider them to 
be sufficient? 
As an ‘additional safety-valve’, the Commission plans to introduce a system where the EU and the US can issue 
binding interpretations. The reference text from CETA further provides the possibility for the non-respondent 
State party to intervene in a dispute. From the consultation text, it appears that the Commission wants to 
combine these two elements. Where, in a given case, the non-respondent State agrees with the interpretation of 
the respondent State, ‘such interpretation is a very powerful statement, which ISDS tribunals would have to 
respect.’ For the parties to a Treaty that confers rights on private parties to intervene directly in an ongoing case 
and issue binding interpretations is a drastic measure. Above all, the planned clause raises once more the 
question: if the Commission has so little confidence in arbitration tribunals, why confer on them the highly 
sensitive task of ‘weighing and balancing’ States’ rights to regulate with the property rights of investors in the 
first place?  
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Recommendation 16 
There has been great controversy in the European Union during consultations 
over the possible inclusion of Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. 
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17. Media Law 
 
There has been debate over the application of investor-state dispute settlement to the area of 
regulation of media ownership and diversity. 
 
In a striking dispute in 2014, Al-Jazeera has lodged a $150 million claim for compensation 
against Egypt in an international investor arbitration tribunal.77 The lawyers for Al-Jazeera – 
Carter-Ruck - notified the Egyptian government that they would seek compensation under the 
investor-state dispute mechanism included in a 1999 investment treaty between Egypt and 
Qatar. The lawyers argued that the Egyptian Government had violated Al Jazeera’s rights as a 
foreign investor in the country by seizing the broadcaster’s property, jamming its signal, and 
arresting and attacking Al Jazeera journalists. Cameron Doley, a senior partner at Carter-
Ruck, commented: ‘There has been a prolonged and sustained attack on Al Jazeera in 
Egypt.’78 He maintained: ‘A media entity is a commercial entity like any other.’79 Doley 
observed: ‘If your business is wiped out in a given country it doesn’t matter if you are Al 
Jazeera, the FT or a manufacturer of car parts – you suffer the loss of your investment.’80 An 
Al-Jazeera spokesman observed that ‘Egypt has severely disrupted Al-Jazeera's business 
activities’ and the military regime was in breach ‘its obligation to respect the right of 
journalists to report freely.’81 The dispute is a fascinating one. The action by Al Jazeera is a 
response to the Egyptian Government’s lack of respect for free speech and a free press. 
Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the use of an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism 
alone will be a suitable remedy to restore the rule of law, and press freedom in Egypt. 
 
The dispute raises larger questions about the use of investor-state dispute settlement in 
respect of the regulation of media law, ownership, diversity, and content. It would appear that 
investor-state dispute settlement could be deployed both in respect of mass media (such as 
television broadcasting, radio broadcasting, and newspapers) and new media (such as 
                                                          
77
  Shawn Donnan, ‘Al Jazeera Sues Egypt $150 m after Crackdown on Journalists’, Financial Times, 28 
April 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7ff2210c-cec0-11e3-ac8d-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz30FnxPsml 
78
  Ibid. 
79
  Ibid. 
80
  Ibid. 
81
  Roy Greenslade, ‘Al-Jazeera demands $150m compensation from Egypt government’, The Guardian, 
29 April 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/apr/29/al-jazeera-egypt 
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broadband, the Internet, search engines, social media, blogs, and micro-blogs, such as 
Twitter). 
 
In the context of Australia, foreign investors could bring actions in respect of a wide of 
regulatory decisions in respect of the Communications Portfolio – including: 
 
* the National Broadband Network 
* Media Ownership – including Foreign Ownership  
* Media Competition and Diversity 
* regulation of television, radio, and newspapers 
* regulation of telecommunications, internet service providers, and new media; and  
* local content rules 
 
The investor-state dispute settlement regime could be relied upon by foreign investors in a 
range of media disputes and controversies. 
 
Historically, there has been a great deal of conflict over local content rules in trade 
agreements and discussions. In its review of bilateral agreements, the Productivity 
Commission considered restrictions on trade in cultural goods.82 The Commission noted: 
 
In examining the case for the inclusion of special restrictions or provisions in Australia’s trade 
agreements on cultural grounds, it should first be recognised that, at least up to some point, Australians 
typically do enjoy and value — and indeed are willing to pay for — representations of their own 
culture or the presentation of material or stories from an Australian perspective or ‘through Australian 
eyes’. While market forces will accordingly go some way towards ensuring an optimum supply of 
culturally-valuable Australian output, the Commission has previously identified forms of market failure 
that may arise in relation to some cultural goods and services, causing an underprovision of such 
material. These provide an economic rationale to consider government actions to off-set these effects.83 
 
 
                                                          
82
  The Productivity Commission, Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements, Melbourne: The Productivity 
Commission, November 2010, 283, http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/104203/trade-
agreements-report.pdf  
83
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The Productivity Commission observed: ‘While some public support for ‘cultural’ 
goods and services may thus be warranted, restrictive trade measures will not 
necessarily be the best mechanism for supporting the production of cultural goods and 
services, or pursuing cultural objectives.’84 However, the Commission was also 
opposed to the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement clauses in trade 
agreements. 
 
Recommendation 17 
In light of the Al-Jazeera dispute, Investor-State Dispute Settlement could have a 
significant impact upon Australian media and communications law – particularly 
in respect of the regulation of media ownership, diversity, and content. 
 
 
                                                          
84
  Ibid. 
